Charles de
Gaulle was born in Lille, France, on 22nd November, 1890. The son of a
headmaster of a Jesuit school, he was educated in Paris. He was a good
student and at the Military Academy St. Cyr, he graduated 13th in the
class of 1912.
Commissioned
as a second lieutenant, the 6 feet 5 tall de Gaulle joined an infantry
regiment commanded by Colonel Henri-Philippe
Petain in 1913.
In the First World War
de Gaulle was wounded twice in the first few months of the conflict.
Promoted to the rank of captain in February, 1915, de Gaulle fought at
Verdun
where he was wounded again and on 2nd March, 1916 was captured by the German
Army. Over the next 32 months he was held in several prisoner of war
camps and made five unsuccessful attempts to escape.
After the Armistice
de Gaulle was assigned to a Polish division being formed in France where
he served under Maxime
Weygand. He fought against the Red Army
during the Civil
War and won Poland's highest military decoration, Virtuti
Militari.
De Gaulle
lectured at the French War College where he worked closely with Henri-Philippe
Petain. Over the next few years the two men demanding a small,
mobile, highly mechanized army of professionals.
De Gaulle's
military ideas appeared in his book, The Army of
the Future (1934). In the book he also criticized the static
theories of war that was exemplified by the Maginot
Line. The book was unpopular with the politicians and the military
who favoured the idea of a mass army of conscripts during war. In 1936
de Gaulle was punished for his views by having his name taken of the
promotion list.
In 1938 de
Gaulle published France and Her Army.
This book caused a disagreement with Henri-Philippe
Petain who accused de Gaulle of taking credit for work done by the
staff of the French War College.
On the outbreak of the Second World War
de Gaulle took over command of the 5th Army's tank force in Alsace. He
soon became frustrated with the military hierarchy who had failed to
grasp the importance of using tanks in mass-attacks with air support.
When the German
Army broke through at Sedan he was given command of the recently
formed 4th Armoured Division. With 200 tanks, de Gaulle attacked the
German panzers at Montcornet on 17th May, 1940. Lacking air support, de
Gaulle made little impact on halting the German advance.
De Gaulle was more
successful at Caumont (28th May) when he became the only French
commanding officer to force the Germans to retreat during the German Invasion of
France.
On the 5th June, 1940, the
French prime minister, Paul
Reynaud, sacked Edouard
Daladier and appointed de Gaulle as his minister of war. De
Gaulle also visited London but
when he returned to France on 16th June he discovered the Henri-Philippe
Petain had ousted Paul
Reynaud as premier and was forming a government that would seek an
armistice with Germany. In danger of being arrested by the new French
government, de Gaulle returned to England. The following day he made a
radio broadcast calling for French people to continue fighting against
the German
Army.
Whereas as President Franklin
D. Roosevelt in the USA recognized Vichy France Winston
Churchill refused and backed de Gaulle as leader of the "Free
French". Henri-Philippe
Petain responded by denouncing de Gaulle. On 4th July, 1940,
a court-martial in Toulouse sentenced him in absentia to four years in
prison. At a second court-martial on 2nd August, 1940, sentenced him to
death.
De Gaulle made attempts to
unify the resistance movements in France. In March 1943 Jean
Moulin, Charles
Delestraint and Andre
Dewavrin managed to unite eight major resistance movements under de
Gaulle's leadership. However, this good work was undermined when in
June, 1943, both Delestraint and Moulin were both arrested by the Gestapo.
On 30th May 1943, de Gaulle
moved to Algeria. The following month the French
Committee of National Liberation (FCNL) was established with de
Gaulle and Henri
Giraud as co-presidents. De Gaulle had difficulty working with his
co-president and by July, 1943, had limited Giraud's power to command of
the armed forces.
Franklin
D. Roosevelt and Winston
Churchill were furious when de Gaulle's announced on 26 May, 1944,
that the FCNL will now be known as the Provisional Government of the
French Republic. Roosevelt and Churchill refused to recognize de
Gaulle's action and decided to exclude him from the planning of Operation
Overlord.
Despite objections from
Britain and the USA, De Gaulle's Provisional Government was recognized
by Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia and Norway.
On 13th July, 1944, the governments of Britain and the USA also agreed
that de Gaulle could help administer the liberated portions of
France.
De Gaulle reached France
from Algiers on 20th August 1944. De Gaulle and his 2nd Armoured
Division was allowed to join the USA Army
when it entered Paris on 25th August. At a public speech later that day
he announced that the French Forces of the
Interior (FFI) would be integrated into the French
Army and the militia would be dissolved. He also offered posts in
his government to leaders of the resistance. Those who took office
included Georges
Bidault, Henry
Frenay and Charles
Tillon.
De Gaulle was upset by not
being invited to the Yalta
Conference but he was allowed to represent France as one of the four
countries to sign the final instrument of surrender with Germany. France
was also given one of the four occupation zones in Germany.
On 13th November, 1945, the
first Constituent Assembly unanimously elected de Gaulle as head of the
French government. He held the post until resigning on 20th January,
1946. He then formed the right-wing group, the Rally
of the French People (RFP). After initial success it declined in
popularity and de Gaulle left it in 1953 and it was disbanded two years
later.
After his retirement from
politics de Gaulle wrote the first three volumes of his memoirs. He
returned to politics in 1958 when he was elected president during the
Algerian crisis. He granted independence to all 13 French African
colonies but the Algerian War continued until 1962.
De Gaulle decided that
France should have its own atom bomb and repeatedly blocked Britain's
attempts to join the European Economic
Community. In 1966 de Gaulle withdrew France from the integrated
military command of NATO.
Following student riots
against his government and negative results in a
referendum, de Gaulle resigned from office in April, 1969. In retirement
he completed his memoirs. Charles De Gaulle died on 9th November,
1970.

(1)
General Charles de Gaulle, attempted to halt the German invasion of
France at Abbeville. He wrote about these events in his book, The
Call to Honour (1955)
By the evening (28th May,
1940) the objective was reached. Only Mont Caubert still held out. There
were a great many dead from both sides on the field. Our tanks had been
sorely tried. Barely a hundred were still in working order. But all the
same, an atmosphere of victory hovered over the battlefield. Everyone
held his head high. The wounded were smiling. The guns fired gaily.
Before us, in a pitched battle, the Germans had retired.
Alas! In the course of the
Battle of France, what other ground had been or would be won, except
this strip of fourteen kilometres deep? If the State had played its
part; if, while there was time, it had directed its military system
towards enterprise, not passivity; if our leaders had in consequence had
at their disposal the instruments for shock and manoeuvre which had been
often suggested to the politicians and to the High Command; then our
arms would have had their chance, and France would have found her soul
again.
(2) Robert
Boothby,
Boothby: Recollections of a
Rebel (1978)
Within hours of the French
capitulation, Louis Spears invited me to lunch to meet what he called 'a
French Brigadier whom I have just brought over from Bordeaux. The
Brigadier was de Gaulle; and the lunch party consisted of Spears, his
wife (Mary Borden), de Gaulle, Mme. de Gaulle, and myself. Spears told
us about their flight, how they had run out of petrol and had to make a
forced landing in the Channel Islands with two minutes to spare. De
Gaulle, who was going to make a broadcast that night, told us that he
thought of saying: "France has lost a battle, but not the war." We all
thought that this was very good. Later on Spears and de Gaulle
quarrelled bitterly when Spears was head of a British Mission to the
Levant, and tried - rightly - to ease the French out of Syria and the
Lebanon. There is no doubt that, in addition to being a brave soldier
and, with Liddell Hart, the most brilliant military historian of our
time, Spears was a natural intriguer.
What is equally beyond
doubt is that, if he had not pulled de Gaulle into that aeroplane at
Bordeaux, de Gaulle would never have been heard of. Spears, and Spears
alone, created de Gaulle; and in so doing made history. De Gaulle knew
it, and resented it. When Spears took him to see Churchill, the latter
said: "Why have you brought this lanky, gloomy Brigadier?" Spears
replied: "Because no one else would come."
(3)
General Charles de Gaulle, BBC radio broadcast (18th June,
1940)
I, General de Gaulle, now in London, call on all
French officers and men who are at present on British soil, or may be in
the future, with or without their arms; I call on all engineers and
skilled workmen from the armaments factories who are at present on
British soil, or may be in the future, to get in touch with me. Whatever
happens, the flame of the French resistance must not and shall not die.
(4)
General Charles de Gaulle, wrote about Lend-Lease
in his book, The Call to Honour (1955)
On March
9th, at dawn, Mr. Churchill came and woke up to tell me, literally
dancing with joy, that the American Congress had passed the "Lend-Lease
Bill," which had been under discussion for several weeks. There was,
indeed, matter of comfort here for us, not only from the fact that the
belligerents were from now on assured of receiving from the United
States the material necessary for fighting, but also because America, by
becoming, in Roosevelt's phrase, "the arsenal of the democracies," was
taking a gigantic step toward war.
(5)
General Charles de Gaulle,
The Call to Honour (1955)
Jean Moulin was
dropped by parachute in France during the night of January 1st. He
carried credentials from me appointing him as my delegate for the
non-occupied zone of Metropolitan France and instructing him to endure
unity of action among the elements of the resistance there. This would
mean that his authority would not, in principle, be disputed. It was
therefore agreed that it was he who would be the centre of our
communications in France, first with the South Zone, then, as soon as
possible, with the North Zone.
(6)
General Charles de Gaulle, The Call to Honour
(1955)
Churchill had made for himself a rule to do
nothing important except in agreement with Roosevelt. Though he felt,
more than any other Englishman, the awkwardness of Washington's methods,
though he found it hard to bear the conditions of subordination in which
United States aid placed the British Empire, and though he bitterly
resented the tone of supremacy which the President adopted towards him,
Churchill had decided, once for all, to bow to the imperious necessity
of the American alliance.
(7)
Winston
Churchill, letter to Franklin
D. Roosevelt (16th December, 1941)
The German
setback in Russia, the British successes in Libya, the moral and
military collapse of Italy, above all the the declarations of war
exchanged between Germany and the United States, must strongly affect
the mind of France and the French Empire. Now is the time to offer to
Vichy and to French North Africa a blessing or a cursing. A blessing
will consist in a promise by the United States and great Britain to
re-establish France as a Great Power with her territories undiminished.
Our relations with General
de Gaulle and the Free French movement will require to be reviewed.
Hitherto the United States have entered into no undertakings similar to
those comprised in my correspondence with him. Through no particular
fault of his own movement has created new antagonism in French minds.
Any action which the united states may now feel able to take in regard
to him should have the effect, inter alia, of redefining our
obligations to him and France so as to make these obligations more
closely dependent upon the eventual effort by him and the French nation
to rehabilitate themselves.
(8)
James F.
Byrnes, as Secretary of State, attended the Yalta
Conference on 4th February, 1945.
In the fall of 1944 the
Soviet Union and the Provisional Government of France had entered into a
treaty of friendship. It was immediately obvious at Yalta, however, that
the treaty and the friendly words exchanged over it by the diplomats had
not changed in any degree Marshal Stalin's opinion on the contribution
of France to the war. He thought France should play little part in the
control of Germany, and stated that Yugoslavia and Poland were more
entitled to consideration than France.
When Roosevelt and
Churchill proposed that France be allotted a zone of occupation, Stalin
agreed. But it was clear he agreed only because the French zone was to
be taken out of the territory allotted to the United States and the
United Kingdom. And he especially opposed giving France a representative
on the Allied Control Council for Germany. He undoubtedly concurred in
the opinion expressed to the President by Mr. Molotov that this should
be done "only as a kindness to France and not because she is entitled to
it."
"I am in favor of France
being given a zone," Stalin declared, "but I cannot forget that in this
war France opened the gates to the enemy." He maintained it would create
difficulties to give France a zone of occupation and a representative on
the Allied Control Council and refuse the same treatment to others who
had fought more than France. He said France would soon demand that de
Gaulle attend the Big
Three's Conferences.
Churchill argued strongly
in favor of France's being represented on the Council. He said the
British public would not understand if questions affecting France and
the French zone were settled without her participation in the
discussion. It did not follow, as Stalin had suggested, that France
would' demand de Gaulle's participation in the conferences of the Big
Three, he added. And, in his best humor, Mr. Churchill said the
conference was "a very exclusive club, the entrance fee being at least
five million soldiers or the equivalent."
(9) Harold
Macmillan, speech in the House of
Commons (31st July 1961)
Therefore, after long and earnest consideration, Her Majesty's
Government have come to the conclusion that it would be right for
Britain to make a formal application under Article 237 of the Treaty for
negotiations with a view to joining the Community if satisfactory
arrangements can be made to meet the special needs of the United
Kingdom, of the Commonwealth and of the European Free Trade
Association.
If, as
I earnestly hope, our offer to enter into negotiations with the European
Economic Community is accepted, we shall spare no efforts to reach a
satisfactory agreement. These negotiations must inevitably be of a
detailed and technical character, covering a very large number of the
most delicate and difficult matters. They may, therefore, be protracted
and there can, of course, be no guarantee of success. When any
negotiations are brought to a conclusion then it will be the duty of the
Government to recommend to the House what course we should pursue.
(10) Charles De Gaulle, speech (4th
January 1963)
The
Treaty of Rome was concluded between six continental States - States
which are, economically speaking, one may say, of the same nature.
Indeed, whether it be a matter of their industrial or agricultural
production, their external exchanges, their habits or their commercial
clientele, their living or working conditions, there is between them
much more resemblance than difference. Moreover, they are adjacent, they
inter-penetrate, they prolong each other through their communications.
It is therefore a fact to group them and to link them in such a way that
what they have to produce, to buy, to sell, to consume - well, they do
produce, buy, sell, consume, in preference in their own ensemble. Doing
that is conforming to realities.
Moreover, it must be added that from the point of view of their
economic development, their social progress, their technical capacity,
they are, in short, keeping pace. They are marching in similar fashion.
It so happens, too, that there is between them no kind of political
grievance, no frontier question, no rivalry in domination or power. On
the contrary, they are joined in solidarity, especially and primarily,
from the aspect of the consciousness they have, of defining together an
important part of the sources of our civilisation; and also as concerns
their security, because they are continentals and have before them one
and the same menace from one extremity to the other of their
territories; finally, they are in solidarity through the fact that not
one among them is bound abroad by any particular political or military
accord.
Thus,
it was psychologically and materially possible to make an economic
community of the Six, though not without difficulties. When the Treaty
of Rome was signed in 1957, it was after long discussions; and when it
was concluded, it was necessary in order to achieve something that we
French put in order our economic, financial, and monetary affairs and
that was done in 1959.
Thereupon Great Britain posed her candidature to the Common
Market. She did it after having earlier refused to participate in the
communities we are now building, as well as after creating a free trade
area with six other States, and, finally, after having - I may well say
it, the negotiations held at such length on this subject will be
recalled - after having put some pressure on the Six to prevent a real
beginning being made in the application of the Common Market. If England
asks in turn to enter, but on her own conditions, this poses without
doubt to each of the six States, and poses to England, problems of a
very great dimension.
England in effect is insular, she is maritime, she is linked
through her exchanges, her markets, her supply lines to the most diverse
and often the most distant countries; she pursues essentially industrial
and commercial activities, and only slight agricultural ones. She has in
all her doings very marked and very original habits and
traditions.
(11) Paul-Henri Spaak, The Continuing
Battle: Memories of an European (1971)
A new
political event of extreme importance was in the making: General de
Gaulle had torpedoed our negotiations without having warned either his
partners or the British. He had acted with a lack of consideration
unexampled in the history of the EEC, showing utter contempt for his
negotiating partners, allies and opponents alike. He had brought to a
halt negotiations which he himself put in train in full agreement with
his partners, and had done so on the flimsiest of pretexts.
What
had happened? There is every reason to believe that it was the attitude
adopted by Macmillan at his meeting with Kennedy in Bermuda which so
upset the President of the French Republic. Macmillan's crime was to
have reached agreement with the President of the United States on
Britain's nuclear, weaponry. He had in fact arranged for the purchase of
Polaris missiles from the United States. In General de Gaulle's eyes the
cooperation with the Americans was tantamount to treason against
Europe's interests and justified his refusal to allow Britain into the
Common Market. The General's resentment was all the greater because a
few days before the Bermuda meeting he had received Macmillan at
Rambouillet. The British Prime Minister, he claimed, had told him
nothing of his nuclear plans. On the other hand, de Gaulle gave
Macmillan no warning that he was about to torpedo the negotiations in
Brussels. I think the full truth about these events still remains to be
told. The French and British versions which have been circulating in the
chancelleries differ, but what is certain is that France, without
consulting her partners, unilaterally withdrew from negotiations to
which she had earlier agreed and that she did so, moreover, after first
insisting that the Six must present a united front.
We
were faced with a complete volte-face. Stunned and angry, our first
reaction was to ignore what had been said in Paris and to continue the
negotiation as if nothing had happened. The British showed extraordinary
sang-froid. Though, deep down, they were greatly shocked, they gave no
outward sign of this and continued to present their arguments at the
negotiating table with imperturbable calm.
(12) Charles De Gaulle, speech (4th
January 1963)
I
should like to speak particularly about the objection to integration.
People counter this by saying: "Why not merge the six states together
into a single supranational entity? That would be very simple and
practical". But such an entity is impossible to achieve in the absence
in Europe today of a federator who has the necessary power, reputation
and ability. Thus one has to fall back on a sort of hybrid arrangement
under which the six states agree to submit to the decisions of a
qualified majority. At the same time, although there are already six
national Parliaments as well as the
European Parliament and, in
addition the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe ... it would
be necessary to elect over and above this, yet a further Parliament,
described as European, which would lay down the law to the six
states.
These
are ideas that might appeal to certain minds but I entirely fail to see
how they could be put into practice, even with six signatures at the
foot of a document. Can we imagine France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg being prepared on a matter of
importance to them in the national or international sphere, to do
something that appeared wrong to them, merely because others had ordered
them to do so? Would the peoples of France, of Germany, of Italy, of the
Netherlands, of Belgium or of Luxembourg ever dream of submitting to
laws passed by foreign parliamentarians if such laws ran counter to
their deepest convictions? Clearly not. It is impossible nowadays for a
foreign majority to impose their will on reluctant nations. It is true,
perhaps, that in this 'integrated' Europe as it is called there might be
no policy at all. This would simplify a great many things. Indeed, once
there was no France, no Europe; once there was no policy - since one
could not be imposed on each of the six states, attempts to formulate a
policy would cease. But then, perhaps, these peoples would follow in the
wake of some outsider who had a policy. There would, perhaps, be a
federator, but he would not be European. And Europe would not be an
integrated Europe but something vaster by far and, I repeat, with a
federator. Perhaps to some extent it is this that at times inspires the
utterances of certain advocates of European integration. If so, then it
would be better to say so.

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